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GUARDIANSHIP
Guardianship Law: New Grounds For Termination. In Guard-
ianship of Claus,1 a ward seeking termination of the guardianship over
her estate was held to have the right to challenge the jurisdiction
of the court which made the original guardianship appointment.
The trial court, in the hearing on the petition for termination of the
guardianship, terminated the guardianship over the person of the
ward but continued the guardianship over the estate and denied a
motion questioning the jurisdiction of the court in appointing the
guardian. This denial was challenged on the appeal from that por-
tion of the order continuing the guardianship over the estate. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, stating that
the denial of the motion "would limit the scope of the hearing on a
petition for termination to the question of return to competency. ' 2 The
court was unwilling to so limit the scope of the hearing, and, by refusing
to do so, expanded the grounds for termination beyond those set forth
in the Wisconsin Statutes.3
Authority for a court in a hearing on a petition for termination
of guardianship to review the jurisdiction of the court making the
appointment was found in Guardianship of Nelson.4 In that case,
which was an appeal from a hearing to settle the final account of
the guardian, a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court making the
guardianship appointment was not allowed. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in commenting on such a challenge, reasoned that
there was ample opportunity to consider both the wisdom and the
jurisdictional prerequisites of the appointment prior to the time of
the final account. Discussing underlying policy for not allowing
such attacks, the court stated: "As long as an interested party
could at any time challenge the validity of the guardian's appoint-
ment, the uncertainties relating to the transfer of title of the ward's
estate created by this situation would make intelligent, prudent
management impossible."5 However, in commenting on the pro-
priety of challenging the appointment at an earlier time, the court
said:
145 Wis. 2d 179, 172 N.W.2d 643 (1969).
2 Id. at 183, 172 N.W.2d at 644.
3 Wis. STAT. § 319.26(2) (1967); A guardianship of the estate shall terminate:
(a) When a minor ward attains his majority. (b) When a minor ward law-
fully marries and the court approves such termination. (c) When the court
adjudicates a former incompetent or a spendthrift to be capable of handling
his property. (d) When a ward dies (unless the estate can be settled as
provided by § 319.28). This ground for termination of a guardianship is also
an expansion beyond those set forth in the Model Probate Code. L. SIMES &
P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING A MlODEL PROBATE CODE
218 § 234 (1946).
421 Wis. 2d 24, 123 N.W.2d 505 (1963).
5 Id. at 29, 123 N.W.2d at 508.
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This is not to say that the original determination of incom-
petency is not open to review. In addition to a direct appeal
of the initial order, any interested party at any time during
the guardianship may petition for a rehearing seeking revo-
cation of the guardian-ward status. At this rehearing an
attack may be made both upon the jurisdiction of the court
making initial appointment and upon the sufficiency of the
evidence support a finding of incompetency.6
The last sentence quoted above, standing as mere dicta in Nelson,
was based on the authority of Guardianship of Warner.? However, in
Warner, no question of jurisdiction was ever raised or decided. The
result of Warner was a reversal of a judgment denying the petition to
set aside the guardianship, with directions to enter judgment declaring
the ward mentally competent,8 and ordering the guardian discharged.
But the rather tenuous dicta of Nelson which first suggested the validity
of a jurisdictional attack on rehearing has now, in Claus, become the
law applicable to a hearing on a petition for termination.
The seriousness of a determination of incompetency and ap-
pointment of a guardian has long been recognizedY The intent of
the court, in protecting the person and interests of the ward, has
been to leave open as many avenues of review of such proceedings
as feasible. Also, the court has commended the practice of appoint-
ing a guardian ad litein in these proceedings where the alleged in-
competent is not present.10 In Claus the absence of the alleged in-
competent from the original guardianship hearing was the asserted
jurisdictional defect which the trial court ruled could not be raised.
Also, there was no guardian ad litem for the alleged incompetent at
the original hearing and it was within this set of circumstances that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an attack on jurisdiction
in the original guardianship hearing could be made at a hearing on
a petition for termination. However, the broad language of the
court does not preclude a jurisdictional attack on an appointment
even if the alleged incompetent was present or was represented by
a guardian ad litem.
The court, in its zealous efforts to protect the rights of the
ward, appears to have inadvertently created a potential problem for
guardians and for third parties seeking to transact business with
6 Id.
7 232 Wis. 467, 287 N.W. 803 (1939).
8 A finding that the ward has returned to competency is one of the statutory
grounds for termination of guardianship of the estate. See note 3, supra.
9 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Welch, 108 Wis. 387, 390, 84 N.W. 550, 551
(1900), where the Court stated, "Only with great hesitation should courts, by
the appointment of a guardian, interfere with the discretion of elderly people,
owing no legal duty of support to any one, in devoting the property ac-
cumulated by them to their comfort according to their own tastes."
10 Guardianship of Nelson, 21 Wis. 2d 24, 30, 123 N.W.2d 505, 509 (1963).
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them. The court did not state the effect of a successful jurisdic-
tional attack on transactions undertaken by a guardian ousted in
this manner. The statutes are also silent in this regard and thus the
question of the validity of such transactions remains unanswered.
As a result, the guardian whose appointment is successfully
attacked on jurisdictional grounds is apt to find himself caught
between a bona fide purchaser for value seeking to enforce a trans-
action and a disgruntled ward seeking to have the transaction
declared void. The resolution of such a situation hinges on the
determination of whether a guardian appointed by a court found
to be without jurisdiction in making the appointment can validly
act on behalf of the ward. At least as to transactions in real estate,
which are subject to court approval,"- it would appear at first glance
that this is a moot question in that the statutes provide:
Every deed, mortgage, lease or other conveyance made in
good faith by the guardian of a minor or incompetent person,
pursuant to any order or judgment of the county or circuit
court or the presiding judge of either, made under the pro-
visions of this chapter, shall be as valid and effectual as if
made by such minor when of full age or by such incompetent
person when of sound memory and understanding.2
However, this statute seems to presume a valid guardianship
and concerns itself with transactions undertaken by a proper
guardian. Thus the effectiveness of the statute in instilling con-
fidence in the capacity of a guardian to effect transactions on behalf
of the ward is questionable as a result of allowing jurisdictional
attacks on guardianship appointments because a successful attack
may result in the guardianship being held to be void ab initio.
A lack of confidence in a guardian's ability to transact business
is inevitable under the decision in Claus. The court recognized this
in Nelson when it stated, "A prospective purchaser of the ward's
real or personal property might be hesitant to execute a sale if he
knew that subsequent litigation might be necessary to establish
him as a bona fide purchaser for value." 13 For the third party the
problem might also arise if the former ward attempts to set aside
a transaction."4 The third party purchaser might therefore have to
initiate proceedings to quiet title to the purchased real estate or he
might be forced to defend his title to real estate or chattels pur-
chased from a guardian.
11 Wis. STAT. § 296.11 (1967).
12 WIs. STAT. § 296.15 (1967).
13 21 Wis. 2d 24, 28-29, 123 N.W.2d 505, 508.
14 In Hammond v. Gibbs, 176 So. 2d 465, (La. App., 2d Cir. 1965) the ward-
children successfully nullified the sale of their property by their father as tutor
on the grounds that the proceeding appointing him tutor and authorizing the
sale were brought in the wrong county and were therefore null and void.
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The guardian's position is weakened by the Claus decision. His
duty to manage the ward's estate 5 may now become more difficult
to carry out. His authority will be suspect, at least until he renders
his final account. Under the present state of the law he runs the
risk of being placed in the precarious position of a guardian de son
tort" and of being exposed to the liabilities of that status.17
Construing a successful jurisdictional attack on the guardian-
ship appointment as affecting the guardian's capacity to manage
the ward's estate is detrimental to the guardian and to third parties.
Furthermore, little can be said to demonstrate any advantages or
safeguards to the ward from such a construction. The loyal fulfill-
ment of the guardian's duties is safeguarded by judicial review
during the course of the guardianship' and the time the guard-
ian renders his final account.19 The ward would not benefit if his
guardian's capacity was affected by such an attack. Presumably, the
court did not intend such results. A different approach would be
advisable, but the court has failed to suggest one.
A more satisfactory approach to interpreting the effect of a
successful jurisdictional attack would be to view it as bringing the
guardianship to an end without affecting the validity of the guard-
ians prior transactions. This is the attitude of the court in the an-
alogous situation of an administrator of an estate being appointed
by a court which lacks jurisdiction.20 The legislature also appears
to favor this approach as to administrators of estates whose status
is revoked.2 Certainly the effect of this approach, if applied to
guardianship law, is more desirable from the viewpoint of all
parties involved.
Support for recognizing a successful jurisdictional attack on an
appointment as merely ending the status can be gleaned from the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's disapproval of the possibility of litiga-
tion arising out of a court-approved transaction. 22 The legislature
has also recently spoken on the topic of court-approved trans-
actions and has taken the position that purchasers for value in such
affairs may conclusively rely on a court's judgment.3
15 Wis. STAT. § 319.19 (1967).
16 Rear v. Olson, 219 Wis. 322, 263 N.W. 337 (1935).
17 See 12 Wis. L. REv. 71 (1947).
is Wis. STAT. § 319.25.
19 ". .. the legislature intended that the only question reviewable in a proceeding
to settle the final account is, Did the guardian loyally discharge his position
of trust ... ?" 21 Wis. 2d 24, 29, 123 N.W.2d 505, 508.
20 Estate of Eannelli, 274 Wis. 193, 80 N.W.2d 240 (1956).
21 WIs. STATS. §§ 311.12, 311.13, 311.14 (1967) restated in Wis. Laws 1969, ch.
339, as § 857.19 effective April 1, 1971.
22 Simpson v. Cornish, 196 Wis. 125, 218 N.W. 193 (1928).
2 Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 339, to be § 863.31 (2).
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Such an approach will not in any way defeat the intent of the
court in protecting wards. If an attack is viewed as merely ter-
minating the guardianship, the proceeding to settle the guardian's
final account must still follow.2 4 At this proceeding, the question
whether the guardian loyally discharged his position of trust would
be taken up.
The unsettling effect of the Claus decision on the certainty of a
guardian's ability to transact business indicates the need for clarifi-
cation of the effect of a successful jurisdictional attack on his
appointment. Awaiting clarification by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court may impede guardians in the discharge of their statutory
duties until such time as an appropriate case is appealed. Such
delay will be detrimental to the administration of a ward's estate.
The legislature would be the more desirable body to deal with this
problem and could easily solve it by declaring a successful juris-
dictional attack on the guardian's appointment to have no effect on
transactions undertaken prior to the attack.
F. JOSEPHr SCHLOSSER
24 WIS. STAT. § 319.27 (1967).
19711
